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Russia marks the 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazism: 
What significance does it have in an epoch  
of global confrontation?
Maria Domańska
The Victory Day celebrations held in Russia on 9 May 2015 were special for marking the se-
ventieth anniversary of the end of World War II but the particular international and domestic 
context they were set in was of yet greater importance. The element which set the celebra-
tions in 2015 apart from those in the preceding years was how the military and moral aspects 
of Soviet victory over Nazi Germany was made part of the current geopolitical confrontation 
with the West concerning the Ukrainian crisis. 
The escalation of the aggressive rhetoric on Europe and the USA and accusations that the 
West is destabilising the international situation and striving for conflict was accompanied 
by a display of the increasing military power of the Russian Federation; the display itself was 
stronger than has been seen in preceding years. This was a clear sign that Moscow is ready 
to protect its national interests in the area of foreign policy by any means. At the same time, 
the creation of an atmosphere of threat and stoking patriotic feelings was intended to mobi-
lise the Russian public around the political leadership while the country’s economic problems 
are deteriorating further. 
The background of the celebrations
The unusual tone of the 9 May celebrations this 
year was to a great extent an effect of the spe-
cial international situation Russia found itself in 
and the country’s evolution as regards domestic 
policy. In an epoch of growing tension in inter-
national relations, the erosion of global order 
and security, Moscow has become more deter-
mined to protect its own national interests and 
influence in the ‘near abroad’ and to rebuild its 
position as a global power. 2014 and 2015 can 
be characterised as years of confrontation be-
tween the Kremlin and the West provoked by 
Russia’s moves with regard to Ukraine preced-
ed by stagnation in co-operation, ever worse 
misunderstandings as regards ‘common values’ 
and ever stronger disagreements over the rules 
of the international order. Mutual political and 
economic sanctions marked the culmination of 
growing tension between Russia and the West. 
The cooling of relations with the European Union 
and the USA has made Moscow ostentatiously 
continue its mainly declaratory ‘turn Eastwards’ 
and highlight its ‘alliance’ with China. 
The key elements of the evolution of the inter-
nal situation in Russia include: the worsening 
economic crisis, the increasing monopolisation 
of political life and civil activity by state ad-
ministration structures, increasing expenses on 
the development of the armed forces, and also 
a re-Sovietisation and radicalisation of the pub-
lic discourse. The latter is manifested through 
witch-hunts carried out against independent 
circles and exploitation of the ‘enemy syndrome’ 
and the ‘besieged castle’ syndrome with added 
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militarist rhetoric. All this is aimed at mobilis-
ing the public around the political leadership. 
The overriding goal of the Kremlin’s policy is to 
maintain the present government system and 
to add public legitimacy to the regime regard-
less of the deteriorating economic situation in 
the country. One of the tools used to achieve 
this goal is the historical policy which has been 
pursued for around ten years and which draws 
primarily upon the Soviet legacy. 
The 9 May celebrations in the context 
of Russia’s historical policy
The martyrdom of the ‘Great Patriotic War’, 
along with the Soviet victory over Nazism are 
the central elements of the historical policy, and 
form the only national myth which genuine-
ly unites the Russian public. This results in the 
sacralisation of the history of the war, which is 
used simultaneously as an auxiliary category to 
support the protection of current national inter-
ests, defined by the government as ‘existential’. 
The language of historical discourse includes re-
ligious references: any discussions questioning 
the ‘canonical’ version of history are branded 
‘blasphemous’ and ‘sacrilegious’. At the same 
time, this topic gained a new sense in 2009, 
when attempts to revise the role played by 
Russia in history were defined in the nation-
al security strategy of the Russian Federation 
as adversely affecting state security1. 
One constituent of the war and victory myth 
is the Messianic idea combined with the the-
sis that the Soviet Union was morally supe-
rior to the rest of the world due to the war 
martyrdom. Important aspects of this con-
struction include the memory of over twenty 
million victims, the mass slaughter of the So-
viet nation in the name of liberating the world 
from the ‘brown plague’, the refusal to accept 
the knowledge about the Stalinist repressions 
1	 Стратегия	 национальной	 безопасности	 Российской	
Федерации	до	2020	года, published on 13 May 2009, 
http://kremlin.ru/supplement/424
and the overly nervous reactions, fomented by 
the government, to any attempts to besmirch 
the image of the USSR (this especially concerns 
the Soviet Union being co-responsible for caus-
ing the war). 
The historical policy, which focused to a great 
extent on upholding this myth,  began in 2004– 
–2005, although the first signs of it were seen 
already in 2002–20032. The key elements of this 
policy include: defending the Soviet vision of 
20th century history; the affirmation of the terri-
torial and military power of the Soviet Union as 
a “peaceful” superpower; negating Communist 
crimes and the Soviet Union’s joint responsibil-
ity for aggressive military actions during World 
War II; emphasising the special merits of the 
USSR in liberating the neighbouring countries; 
and the glorification of a strong government 
and public mobilisation in the militarist spirit. 
The cultivation of the constitutive elements of 
the myth of the Great Patriotic War has allowed 
the Russian government to achieve important 
goals in domestic policy. These are above all: 
the cult of a strong leader, public approval of 
the system evolving towards authoritarianism, 
and a readiness to make sacrifices in the name 
of the state’s power. One peculiar illustration 
2 Then Vladimir Putin suggested that historians should 
adopt a more patriotic approach when working on the 
content of history textbooks. Magdalena Ostrowska, 
‘Znaczenie rosyjskiej polityki historycznej dla odbudowy 
statusu mocarstwowego państwa’, Stosunki	Międzyna-
rodowe	–	International	Relations, no. 1–2 (vol. 41) 2010, 
p. 130. The first attempts to comprehensively formu-
late the historical policy were made as a reaction to the 
Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 and as the 60th 
anniversary of the end of World War II was approaching 
in 2005.
The martyrdom of the ‘Great Patriotic War’, 
along with the Soviet victory over Nazism 
are the central elements of the historical 
policy, and form the only national myth 
which genuinely unites the Russian public. 
3OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 171
of this success is the noticeable increase in the 
percentage of Russians who justify Stalinist re-
pressions3. In turn, as regards foreign policy, 
the apotheosis of the USSR and its imperial pol-
icy might signify that Russia is determined to 
rebuild its status as a powerful state (including 
by forcing other countries to ‘respect’ Russian 
national interests even beyond the borders of 
the Russian Federation).
The political message of the celebrations
The preparations for the celebrations this year 
and the publicity given to them by the media, 
as well as statements from official representa-
tives of the Russian Federation all added to the 
confrontational vision of the world4 and sug-
gested that the stance taken by the West not 
only on Russia but also in the wider context on 
international security issues5 was making the 
risk of war at least on the regional scale ever 
more real. Nazism (more often referred to as 
Fascism)  has been used as one aspect of the 
3 The percentage of respondents who said that Stalinist 
repressions were worth the great goals achieved by 
the Soviet Union increased from 25% in 2012 to 45% 
in March 2015. See the survey conducted by Levada Cen-
tre in March 2015: http://www.levada.ru/31-03-2015/
stalin-i-ego-rol-v-istorii-strany 
4 See the communications from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (including ‘Комментарий Уполномоченного 
МИД России по вопросам прав человека, демократии 
и верховенства права К.К.Долгова по поводу 
антироссийских акций в ФРГ’, http://mid.ru/brp_4.
nsf/newsline/97C7CDB93890E10B43257E3000543254), 
the statements from Minister Sergey Lavrov (for ex-
ample, during the meeting dedicated to the 70th anni-
versary of victory on 5 May: http://mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/
newsline/92EABBBD7146836843257E3C004BD3F4), 
the unofficial opinion from Defence Minister Sergey 
Shoygu published on Twitter (“the rally through Po-
land should be in tanks”, https://twitter.com/s_shoigu/
status/591686606727335936), the accusations that the 
West is destabilising the international situation due to 
the stance taken by the EU and the USA on the conflict 
in Ukraine reiterated on many occasions, including by 
Vladimir Putin himself.
5 In this context, the West’s stance on disarmament trea-
ties has been criticised, as have the alleged questioning 
of the fundamental rules of international law and UN 
prerogatives by the Euro-Atlantic partners; US policy in 
the Middle East and North Africa; and last but not least – 
the ‘unfair’ and ‘inadequate’ reaction of the West to the 
Ukrainian crisis in the form of anti-Russian sanctions. 
pivot of this message, suggesting that it is un-
dergoing a revival, for example, in Ukraine, 
and thus poses a threat to European security. 
The other aspect of the pivot is the emphasis 
put on Russia’s growing military power, espe-
cially as compared to previous celebrations. 
One reflection of this was the military parade 
held on an unprecedented scale6. This latter 
move had an almost explicitly anti-Western 
tone in the context of the amendments of the 
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation to-
wards the end of 2014, where the threats alleg-
edly posed by NATO were emphasised in an es-
pecially negative tone. The statement made by 
Vladimir Putin in March 2015, who announced 
that plans were being made to possibly place 
Russian nuclear forces on standby during the 
annexation of Crimea provided an alarming 
context7. The anniversary on 9 May 2015 was 
thus less a peace holiday and more an oppor-
tunity to show off military triumph and power. 
Both the preparations for the 9 May ceremony 
and Vladimir Putin’s speech on Red Square car-
ried a clear message addressed to Russia’s for-
eign partners (the West, and especially Europe 
demonstrating a pacifist approach, should be 
viewed as the main audience). In his speech Pu-
6 The topic of new, technologically advanced military 
equipment and weapon models which “have no foreign 
equivalents” which were to be presented during the pa-
rade on the Red Square was ostentatiously given a great 
deal of publicity. Over 16,000 soldiers (in previous years 
this number was slightly over 11,000), and around 200 
military equipment units (the number was 150 in 2014, 
the highest since 1991) took part in the parade. 
7 Vladimir Putin’s statement in the film Crimea	–	Way	to	
the	Fatherland broadcast on 15 March 2015 on the Rus-
sia 1 channel (available at: http://russia.tv/brand/show/
brand_id/59195).
The cultivation of the constitutive ele-
ments of the myth of the Great Patriotic 
War allows  the Russian government to 
achieve important goals in domestic and 
foreign policy.
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tin in fact warned that the situation seen in late 
1930s could be repeated, pointing out that ‘en-
lightened’ Europe had at that time disregard-
ed the problem of Hitlerism, and he appealed 
for ‘vigilance’ given the modern challenges. 
He also raised the issue of threats being cre-
ated as a consequence of attempts to build a 
unipolar world order and a ‘bloc mindset based 
on force’, which was a clear missive in the di-
rection of Washington. Thus a legible parallel 
has been built in an attempt to bring about 
a perception of modern reality through the 
prism of war martyrdom. 
The thesis that it is the West’s current policy 
that is driving the world into a new war was 
accompanied by the suggestion that the Soviet 
Union’s victory over Nazism legitimises Russia’s 
mandate to defend the rules of the internation-
al order developed as a consequence of the war 
(as opposed to the West’s attempts to revise 
it). This also gives Moscow the right to decide 
on the international order within its ‘near’ and 
‘far’ abroad. Furthermore, this right can be en-
forced using real military instruments (i.e. those 
presented during the parade). Thus its Euro- 
-Atlantic partners, wishing to avoid a global 
conflict, should in the Kremlin’s opinion accept 
the proposal (which was renewed in Putin’s 
speech) to create a new system without any 
blocs for ‘equal’ (indivisible) international secu-
rity, thus diminishing the role of NATO as the 
guarantor of security in the Euro-Atlantic area. 
Although these issues had already been raised 
on numerous occasions in previous years in of-
ficial Russian discourse, the new quality is the 
context in which this rhetoric has been used 
again. Russia’s military aggression on Ukraine 
and its ostentatious manifestation of military 
power during the parade on 9 May are caus-
ing Moscow’s verbal threats and ‘warnings’ 
to shift from a strictly political platform to 
a military level. 
Also worth noting is the evolution of Moscow’s 
official stance on the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. 
During a joint press conference with Angela 
Merkel on 10 May, Vladimir Putin authoritative-
ly and clearly justified the pact as vital for the 
Soviet Union’s national security which had been 
put at risk due to Western countries’ irrespon-
sible policy. This was the first time the Russian 
president expressed his opinion on this issue so 
firmly, and he did it at a high-level meeting8. 
It appears that this statement came above all 
as a clear sign that Moscow will not accept any 
discussions concerning the moral and legal as-
pects of superpower policy – whether one pur-
sued by the USSR or modern Russia –nor does it 
intend to ‘excuse itself’ for its actions, and any 
responsibility for consequences that are unde-
sirable to other countries would be placed on 
their leaders, who “force” the Kremlin to take 
the “necessary” measures to take care of the 
vital interests of the Russian Federation. 
Along with the continuation of confrontational 
rhetoric, approximately one month before the 
9 May celebrations, the Russian government 
introduced elements of a ‘constructive’ mes-
sage into the discourse concerning the West, 
suggesting it would be ready to co-operate and 
develop mutual relations. Vladimir Putin said 
8 Although attempts to justify the Ribbentrop–Molotov 
Pact had already been seen in Russian public discourse 
(for example, during the discussion concerning this issue 
in 2009, when some Russian historians and represent-
atives of state institutions argued that the decision to 
strike the deal was right), Vladimir Putin for the first time 
backed this opinion in November 2014 during a meeting 
with young historians (http://kremlin.ru/events/presi-
dent/news/46951).
In Russia’s view  the Soviet Union’s victo-
ry over Nazism gives Moscow the right to 
decide on the international order within 
its ‘near’ and ‘far’ abroad.
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this at a teleconference on 16 April, and this 
was repeated by the speaker of the State Duma, 
Sergey Naryshkin and the head of the Presiden-
tial Administration, Sergey Ivanov9. It cannot be 
ruled out that this move had the tactical ob-
jective of attempting to guarantee a turnout 
at the anniversary celebrations that would satis-
fy Russian ambitions. In turn the fact that Putin 
reiterated the declaration of co-operation dur-
ing a meeting with the Czech president, Milos 
Zeman, on 9 May, and commented in a rather 
moderate manner on the absence of Western 
leaders during the celebrations indicates that 
the long-term goal of this milder rhetoric is 
to soften the West’s stance on sanctions due 
to the deteriorating results achieved by the Rus-
sian economy. 
While the Moscow celebrations were boycotted 
by almost all Western leaders, the hosts demon-
strated ostentatious appreciation to China, pre-
sented as the main Russian ally. The significance 
of the Russian-Chinese summit which saw over 
thirty bilateral agreements signed and also the 
manifestation of close relations between the 
two leaders at the time of the celebrations was 
additionally strengthened by historical nar-
rative. On 8 May, the Russia 1 channel broad-
cast a film titled Russia	and	China	–	the	heart	
of	 Eurasia,	 which not only emphasised the 
long tradition of co-operation and the excep-
9 Vladimir Putin noticeably softened his rhetoric towards 
the West during the teleconference, declaring the will to 
co-operate “on equal terms”; https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=kgJgAv8bUgQ. See also: Нарышкин	предложил	
приступить	 к  объединению	 России	 и  Евросоюза, 
28 April 2015, http://lenta.ru/news/2015/04/28/narysh-
kin/; Иванов:	 РФ	 готова	 сотрудничать	 с	 Западом	 по	
международным	 проблемам, 2 May 2015, http://ria.
ru/politics/20150502/1062160639.html
tional bonds existing between the two coun-
tries, but also extensively presented the Soviet- 
-Chinese struggle against ‘Japanese militarism’ 
during World War II (this latter subject was, by 
the way, explicitly raised during Putin’s speech 
at Red Square). All these moves marked a spe-
cific culmination of the Russian ‘turn Eastward’, 
which is intended as a clear propaganda mes-
sage that Russia has an attractive alternative to 
relations with the West as regards both mod-
ern politics and the defence of ‘historical truth’ 
on which the foundations of the sovereignty 
of the Russian state are based. Furthermore, it 
should be expected that Moscow will also make 
use in its propaganda of the fact that soldiers 
representing the two most populous nations, 
China and India, took part in the victory parade. 
The celebrations of the 70th anniversary of Vic-
tory Day also contained a message concerning 
the role of Russia in the post-Soviet area, ad-
dressed both to the former Soviet republics and 
the West: the common victory of the multina-
tional Soviet army over Nazism, according to the 
Kremlin’s intentions, legitimises Russia’s domi-
nance within its ‘traditional zone of influence’ 
and also means that the nations living within 
this zone are obliged to accept the Russian 
viewpoint on the ‘war on Fascism’ in Ukraine. 
This message is also intended to promote the 
reintegration idea based on the Eurasian Union 
project, which is thus taking on the features of 
a ‘natural’ process based on a shared history 
and common system of fundamental values. 
The authorities’ manifesto addressed to the 
Russian public on the occasion of the anniversa-
ry was equally important. The task of the rhet-
oric which dominates the public space was to 
build up national pride and patriotism based on 
an awareness of the state’s military strength, 
as well as Messianism and martyrdom as proofs 
of uniqueness of the Russian nation10. The build-
10 The apotheosis of the military triumph was strength-
ened through interviews with war veterans broadcast 
on 9 May: they made such memorable statements 
as “our country is invincible”, “Europe should remember 
who defeated the Nazis and needs to know that we are 
able to defend ourselves.” 
Moscow will not accept any discussions 
concerning the moral and legal aspects of 
superpower policy – whether one pursued 
by the USSR or modern Russia –nor does 
it intend to ‘excuse itself’ for its actions.
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ing up and solidifying of the symbols of nation-
al pride and glory in the public space also had 
the intention of achieving the same purpose11. 
Regardless of all this, the militarist rhetoric and 
the stress put on the risk of a conflict on more 
than a local scale was apparently intended to 
serve as a means of maintaining the level of 
the Russian public’s mobilisation around their 
leader in conditions of economic crisis and 
their decreasing interest in the developments 
in Ukraine12. Vladimir Putin in his speech pre-
sented himself to the public as a saviour who 
is making efforts to save the world from a ca-
tastrophe. This kind of ‘mission’ is apparently 
intended at automatically legitimising the gov-
ernment’s moves at home and in the interna-
tional arena in the eyes of the nation. 
11 The symbolism of ‘the Ribbon of Saint George’ , the ma-
terial manifestation of loyalty to the Kremlin, which had 
been popularised since 2005, was primarily used for this 
purpose, and on an unprecedented scale.
12 This tendency was reflected by public opinion polls con-
ducted in April – May 2015. See http://radiovesti.ru/ar-
ticle/show/article_id/136358 (VCIOM survey) and http://
www.levada.ru/05-05-2015/ukrainskii-krizis (Levada 
Center survey).
However, special attention needs to be paid not 
so much to the official part of the celebrations 
but to the ‘Immortal Regiment’ march which 
was led by the president himself and which 
was to a great extent a grassroots initiative13. 
The government has thus used a social initia-
tive which had been developing over the past 
few years for its own needs, appropriating so-
cial enthusiasm and the authentic need to com-
memorate the fallen. Taking into account the 
significance of the victory myth as a Russian 
‘national idea’, Putin heading the march ac-
cepted the role of the guarantor of the security 
and development of the Russian identity and 
in a way personified the greatest achievement 
in Russian history, while the march itself was 
presented as a clear manifestation of support 
for the authorities14. Loyalty to the state, its 
‘sacred’ historical achievements, and the prom-
ise of power and development have become 
equated to loyalty to the leader. 
13 This is an increasingly popular initiative as part of which 
people participate in a solemn march holding portraits 
of those who fought during the Great Patriotic War. 
The first time this march was held in Tomsk in 2012 on 
the initiative of workers of the local TV2 channel. In 2013, 
the march was held in 120 places in Russia, and since 2014 
the initiative has also spread to other countries. 
14 One proof of the effectiveness of this move in the in-
ternational context is the statement by the UN Secre-
tary General Ban Ki-moon, who went to Moscow for the 
9 May celebrations. The secretary announced that ini-
tially he thought the march was an anti-governmental 
demonstration, but later he understood that this was 
a ‘pro-governmental manifestation’, adding that Putin 
certainly “deserved the love of the nation.” See http://
lifenews.ru/news/153701
Common victory of the multinational 
Soviet army over Nazism, according to 
the Kremlin’s intentions, legitimises Rus-
sia’s dominance within its ‘traditional 
zone of influence’.
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Conclusions
The unprecedented grandeur of the Victory 
Day celebrations this year, including the scale 
of the military parade, indicate that the myth 
of the Great Patriotic War is being more and 
more intensively used in the Russian public 
discourse, and that the government wants it 
to plug the gap caused by the lack of a ‘Rus-
sian idea’, to consolidate a nation which is still 
looking for a foundation to build their iden-
tity on. It should be expected that a strategy 
of this kind will make Russia more assertive as 
regards the ‘defence of historical truth’: it can-
not be ruled out that legal acts preventing un-
restricted discussions in this field will be passed 
in the future15, and it is likely that the argu-
ments for passing them will include the need 
to respect the needs, memory and expectations 
of the public. 
This kind of narrative is also intended to imple-
ment foreign policy goals. The most important 
of them include gaining approval from foreign 
partners for Russia to play the dominant role in 
the post-Soviet area; the reconstruction of the 
European security architecture to fit Russian in-
terests; and the maximisation of the economic 
and political benefits of co-operation with the 
West without any concessions from Moscow. 
15 The appeal to counteract the ‘forgery of history’ by legal 
measures was reiterated in early May. See the statement 
made by the member of the Council of the Federation, 
Lilia Gumerova on 5  May 2015: http://rusnovosti.ru/
posts/372654
